Cite as: 600 U. S. ___ (2016)

Opinion of the Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 14--8570

ZUBIK V. BURWELL Argued: March 23rd, 2016; Decided: April 3rd, 2016

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[April 4th, 2016]

JUSTICE RANKINE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner David A. Zubik oversees the Roman Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh, a religiously affiliated nonprofit institution whose female employees, under the Affordable Health Care Act passed in 2010, are guaranteed access to contraceptives and other forms of preventative care by the group plan if they are capable of reproduction. The act, as enforced by the Department of Health and Human Services, allows an exception for religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations to refuse to provide this contraceptive aid on the grounds of their beliefs, requiring them to notify their insurance providers or the federal government in order to have the third party provide this care separately. The petitioner argues that this process constitutes a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which holds that the government may not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” The diocese’s role in facilitating this process of exemption, according to the petitioner, would involve them in providing preventative care for their employees and thus violate their religious beliefs against their will. Thus, the petitioner, on behalf of various other petitioners claiming similar arguments in class-action suit, filed a civil claim against the defendant Sylvia Burwell, the Secretary of Health and Human Services on Section C of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The defendant claims that this exemption provided to religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations under the HHS regulations of the Affordable Healthcare Act does not violate RFRA in that this exemption has been proved to be “the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest” under Section B of RFRA, with that being the protection of “women’s interest in full and equal health coverage.” In full, the argument of the petitioners, according to the defendant, has no merit in that the petitioner’s religious objections to the facilitation of the exemption process conflicts with this aforementioned interest of the government when it is the least restrictive means of advancing such.

The case, involving the federal government as a litigant, was first brought to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and was trialed by the Honorable Joy Flowers Conti and Honorable Arthur J. Schwab. The district court, issuing a preliminary injunction and later a permanent injunction, ruled in favor of the petitioner on November 21st, 2013, arguing that “[the appellees] … succeed on the merits of proving that their right to freely exercise their religion has been substantially burdened by the ‘accommodation’ which requir[ing] [one] to sign a form which thereby facilitates/initiates the provision of contraceptive products, services, and counseling” contrary to their religious beliefs. The defendant then appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third District, with arguments being brought forth before the Court on November 19th, 2014. The appellate court formally reversed the decision made by the district court, providing in its opinion issued February 11th, 2015 that the act of filing their religious objections with the insurer or the federal government cannot make them complicit in the act of providing such preventative care services by the third party and would not impose a legitimately substantial burden on their religious beliefs. The Court explained the basis for this notion in stating that “free exercise jurisprudence instructs [them] to examine the act the appellees must perform—not the effect of that act—to see if it burdens substantially the appellees’ religious exercise.” Thus, the court “conclude[d] that the appellees have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their RFRA claim, based on [this] determination, [and that ] the question of whether the accommodation is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest” would therefore not be a question relevant to the case. The petitioner then filed an appeal to the Court on April 15th, 2015 for review of the appellate court’s decision. On November 6th, 2015, the Court filed a writ of certiorari ordering the review of the decision made in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third District, specifically concerning the question brought by the petitioner regarding whether the preventive care accommodation provided by ACA and the Department of Health and Human Services for nonprofit organizations is the least restrictive means of advancing the government’s interests while preserving the religious freedom of said organizations. Oral argument by both litigants was provided on the 23rd of March, conference on the 1st of April, with the final decision being reached in a unanimous vote on the 3rd of April.

The question provided concerns primarily concerns the free exercise clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution in that the petitioner charges that the discussed accommodation under ACA violates his freedom to exercise his religious beliefs. Specifically, the petitioner argues that applying for this accommodation by filing the appropriate forms with the insurer or federal government makes them complicit in the process of providing preventive healthcare to the employees of the diocese, which in turn forces them to violate their religious beliefs as a result of the federal government’s contrary interests (the HHS mandate). The petitioner thus sought to challenge this accommodation under RFRA under the point that the federal government has not proven the exemption provision to be the least restrictive means of advancing its interests here against his religious freedom guaranteed in the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.

In regards to this question of whether the petitioner’s free exercise liberties are indeed substantially burdened by the exemption provided by the defendant to the preventative care that must be provided in group plans in ACA, the Court here defers to the precedent established in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores (2010), where it was held that for-profit corporations are subject to the same preventative care exemptions that HHS provides to religiously-affiliated nonprofit corporations. The opinion of the Court stated that forcing such corporations to provide preventative healthcare for its employees that its owners object provides a substantial burden on their religious freedom while also holding that applying the same HHS exemption mandate to these corporations would be the least restrictive means of maintaining the government’s compelling interest in ensuring access to preventative healthcare under RFRA. The Court here acknowledges that the exemption process that nonprofits (such as that under the supervision of the plaintiff) undergo would make their claims of a substantial burden being placed on their religious freedom legitimate. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Third District was ultimately misguided in its decision that the plaintiffs cannot show that the exemption substantially burdened their religious beliefs, as the judiciary ultimately has no basis to judge whether a particular act substantially burdens an individual’s religious beliefs. Only the stated principles of that individual, as declared in Hobby Lobby Stores, are responsible for determining that. However, the judiciary does has a basis in the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to determine whether the government has pursued the least restrictive means of pursuing a compelling interest for society against one’s religious beliefs.

The Court ultimately maintains its position in the earlier decision that the HHS contraceptive mandate is indeed the least restrictive means of accomplishing the government’s stated interest in ensuring women’s access to preventative care and services. Such an interest relates to the private, consensual sexual conduct of women, which, as the ACLU stated in its brief, is further related to the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) where it held that such conduct, regardless of sexual orientation, was a liberty protected under the guarantee of due process in Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also defers to the decision made in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), where it held had upheld the use of contraceptives as part of the same right to privacy of sexual conduct on the same constitutional basis. Since the Court has clearly recognized such a liberty for women to manage their own private sexual conduct, which includes their decision to use such preventative care and services, the federal government thus has a compelling interest in ensuring that women have access to the appropriate healthcare to manage such sexual conduct. RFRA holds that the federal government advance this interest while also considering the religious objections of plaintiff to women being provided with such healthcare, which the HHS exemption mandate, again, is indeed the least restrictive means of doing so, as it initially held in Hobby Case.

* * *

The petitioner remains mandated to facilitate the aforementioned exemption process in order to allow insurers to provide the appropriate preventative healthcare services to his employees in the diocese. Thus, the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals, except in regards to its understanding of substantial burdens on free exercise of religion, is

Affirmed.

History: [http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/zubik-geneva-op-below.pdf]{.underline}

RFRA text: [https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000bb%E2%80%931]{.underline}

Misc info: [https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1418]{.underline}, [http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/zubik-v-burwell/]{.underline}